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MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT
SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Korea
Taegu Urban Transport Project (Loan 2908-KO)
Attached is the Project Completion Report (PCR) on the Korea: Taegu Urban Transport project
(Loan 2908-KO, approved in FY88), prepared by the East Asia and Pacific Regional Office. The Borrower
did not contribute Part 11. The Loan for US$30 million equivalent was closed on December 31, 1993, as
planned.
The loan was the second by the Bank to support urban transport in Korea. This project had a well-
focused scope and objectives. The objectives were to assist the city of Taegu, a large regional center in
South Eastern Korea to (a) increase the efficiency and capacity of the city's transportation system through
the application of transportation system management measures and the construction of a major urban
expressway with associated links; and (b) build the institutional capacity to plan, design and implement
traffic and safety improvements to deal with future transportation problems. New infrastructure work,
intersection improvements, pedestrian facilities and traffic signals were implemented; the project also
included land acquisition, bridges and consultant services for construction supervision. Technical
assistance included equipment, training, and advisory services. Due to unexpected escalation of land prices
in Korea, the construction of three access roads was postponed to be completed using the city's own
resources at a later date. The price increase of land did lower the project's economic rate of return (ERR)
from estimated 37 percent to 21 percent.
The PCR gives an adequate report on project execution. There is, however, no information on
supervision. This is an important omission because the Borrower did successfully manage resettlement and
land acquisition in spite of an unexpected four-fold increase in land prices. This caused a one year delay in
physical execution but the project was still closed as planned. The Borrower appears to have anticipated
changes which affected project implementation, prepared for them, and took well-timed appropriate actions.
What factors contributed to such a dynamic management are of general interest to the Bank and should have
been investigated or reported.
The outcome is rated as satisfactory, its sustainability as likely, and its impact on institutional
development as substantial.
No audit is planned.
Attachment
This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official
duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.
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iREPUBLIC OF KOREA
TAEGU URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2908-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Preface
This is the Project Completion Report (PCR) for the Taegu Urban Transport Project, for which
Loan 2908-KO, in the amount of US$30 million equivalent, was approved on February 9, 1988, and
became effective on November 15, 1988. The Loan was fully disbursed by October 1, 1993, and was
closed on December 31, 1993.
The PCR was prepared by the Infrastructure Operations Division, Country Department I, East
Asia and Pacific Region. The Report's findings are based on a review of the documents in the project








1. Urbanization throughout Korea has progressed very rapidly, placing very heavy demands on the
major cities. As a part of the total national population, the urban population grew from 50 percent in
1970, to 79 percent in 1990. By 1985, Seoul, Inchon and the surrounding Kyonggi Province in the
northwest accounted for about 50 percent of manufacturing employment, 50 percent of urban population
and 40 percent of total population, while Pusan, Taegu and Kyong Buk and Kyong Nam Provinces in the
southeast accounted for another 40 percent of manufacturing employment, 30 percent of urban population
and 30 percent of total population. During the 1980s, however, the rapid urban growth began to shift
from Seoul to the regional cities. During the last decade, the populations of Taegu, Inchon and Kwangju
grew up to 3.2 percent per annum, while the populations of Seoul and Pusan increased at 1.9 and 1.5
percent per annum, respectively, and the Korea's overall population growth rate declined to less than 1
percent per annum.
2. The Bank's involvement in urban transportation in the Republic of Korea began in 1980, in
response to a Government request for Bank assistance to review the urban transport situation in major
cities. The mission identified the need for improvement in traffic and transport management, urban
transport policy formulation, strengthening of key institutions and improvement of coordination among
various national and local governmental institutions. The Government subsequently undertook
Transportation Improvement Studies, financed by the Bank, in the major cities (Seoul, Pusan, Taegu,
Kwangju and Taejon), which formed the basis for subsequent urban transportation projects in Korea. The
first such project was implemented in Seoul (the Seoul Urban Transportation Project, Loan 2514-KO,
approved in May, 1985, closed in June 1992). Taegu City, with a population of 2.1 million (in 1986),
was selected as the second city for the Bank-supported urban transport project. Taegu was the third
largest city in Korea and a major regional center in Kyong Buk Province in the Southeast.
3. The project was designed to assist TCG to manage future traffic problems by supporting two of
TCG's principal transport-related objectives:
(a) to increase the efficiency, capacity and safety of the existing transportation system in
Taegu through the introduction and applications of transportation system management
(TSM) techniques and the construction of a major urban expressway with associated
links; and
(b) to build the institutional capacity to plan, design and implement traffic and safety
improvement, and deal with future transportation problems.
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Implementation Experience
4. Implementation of the project was satisfactory. The Construction and Housing Bureau carried
out the civil works and land acquisition components of the project. The TSM component was
implemented by the Traffic Police Section and the Transportation Planning and Management Division.
The project was implemented over a five year period, with the loan becoming effective on November 15,
1988, and closed on December 31, 1993. The implementation schedule slipped due to delays in land
acquisition, which also caused a large increase in the overall cost of the project. Disbursements were
somewhat off the estimated disbursement schedule due to these delays. However, the project loan was
fully disbursed as of October 1, 1993, and was closed on December 31, 1993, as scheduled at appraisal.
5. The right-of-way required for the project involved the acquisition of 179,965 square meters of
land and the relocation of 1,990 families (7,090 people). Land acquisition for Shinchon started in 1984,
with the proceedings governed by the 1975 "Special Law on Acquisition and Compensation of Lands for
Public Use", which satisfied Bank resettlement requirements. These procedures were, furthermore,
carried out in accordance with agreements reached at appraisal and negotiations. The estimated total land
acquisition cost for the project at appraisal was Won 37.7 billion (US$47.1 million) including the
relocation of 2,300 families. However, land prices throughout Korea increased dramatically more than
expected. In 1990, TCG decided to extend the project implementation schedule by one year to the end
of 1993, which coincided with the loan closing date. During implementation of the land acquisition
component, TCG was successful in paying a fair and timely compensation for both property and loss of
livelihood, and even provided alternative housing. TCG paid US$170 million (or 60% of the actual total
project cost) for the land acquisition and compensation, which was almost quadruple the estimated costs
at appraisal (US$45.5 million).
Results
6. Overall, the project has been a success. While some of the cross roads of Shinchon Expressway
were postponed, the project made a substantial contribution toward achieving TCG's goals for an increase
in traffic efficiency, capacity and safety in Taegu through the introduction and application of TSM
techniques and the construction of Shinchon Expressway with its associated links. Qualitative and
quantitative indicators show that the TSM and safety investments, together with Shinchon Expressway,
had a city-wide impact, resulting in significantly reduced delays and accident rates. This project also
created a significant institutional benefit by strengthening TCG's transportation planning and traffic
management capability.
7. The economic rates of return (ERRs) for the project were estimated at appraisal to be 25 % with
a benefit in vehicle operations costs (VOC) only, and 37% with both benefits in VOC and the value of
time saved. Traffic volumes increased slightly more than those predicted at appraisal, with estimated
annual average rate increases of 8. 11 percent between 1988-1996, and 6.82 percent from 1996 on, which
pushed up the benefits. Bid prices were also lower than expected. However, benefits from lower bid
prices and increased traffic were more than offset by the increased land acquisition and compensation
costs, which quadrupled from US$45.5 million to US$170 million doubling the project's total cost from
US$145.7 million to US$269.3 millon. This resulted in lower ERRs than expected at appraisal -- 12.3%
for the case with VOC only and 20.8% for the case with VOC and time savings.
Proiect Sustainability
8. The Bank-financed sub-projects are likely to maintain acceptable levels of net benefit throughout
their economic life. TCG has been providing a proper budget for maintenance of the Sinchon
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Expressway. The expressway and bridges financed by the Bank provide access to the expressway, which
created an essential capacity for diverting the north-south traffic from trunk city streets and significantly
eased traffic congestion in the city. The 6-lane Shinchon Expressway currently provides sufficient
capacity to accommodate the 110-120 thousand vehicles per day expected by the year 2008, and has
diverted enough traffic from the central business district (CBD) to have allowed the TSM measures to
be fully effective. On the institutional side the main risk is that the TSM measures would not be adjusted
to new traffic conditions. However, there is every indication that TSM has been adopted and will
continue to gain force in Taegu. Even during implementation, the TSM were adapted to changing
circumstances, providing useful experience for future changes expected to arise from the construction of
a subway system.
9. One threat to sustainability is that traffic volumes continue to increase faster than forecasts, and
have potential to outstrip capacity, leading to a degradation of any TSM strategy as inner-city roads
become over saturated. However, subway construction works are underway, which, upon completion,
should absorb some traffic and will contribute to securing the lasting efficiency of the TSM efforts in the
city, even for future traffic. This is especially true since, once public transportation is in place, demand-
side measures to control traffic volumes become more feasible. The benefits from safety improvements
would also increase after the completion of the subway system as intersection improvements including
channelization, markings and pedestrian facilities, were designed to reduce accidents for efficient and non-
saturated traffic flows.
Lessons Learned
10. The major risk identified at appraisal was that of potential delays related to the relocation of an
estimated 2,000 families. The risk was not considered great because, "experience indicates that
assessment and payment of compensation to affected persons is done in a fair and timely manner in
Korea." What was not predicted was that the dramatic increase in the cost of land lead to delays in
coming up with the funds to finance fair compensation. The appraisal was correct in its assessment that
TCG had proper resources to recover the hike in the project cost because the main sources of revenue
for TCG were the acquisition tax (based on land purchases), registration tax (also based on land
purchases) and property tax (based on assessed value of fixed assets). However, as it turned out, the land
acquisition and compensation costs were nearly quadrupled, resulting in a significant underestimation of
the required cost and time, and TCG had to postpone the construction of the three cross roads of
Shinchon Expressway. The Bank needs to ensure that the cost and scheduling of land acquisition are
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1. Urbanization throughout Korea has progressed very rapidly, placing very heavy demands on the
major cities. As a part of the total national population, the urban population grew from 50 percent in
1970, to 79 percent in 1990. By 1985, Seoul, Inchon and the surrounding Kyonggi Province in the
northwest accounted for about 50 percent of manufacturing employment, 50 percent of urban population
and 40 percent of total population, while Pusan, Taegu and Kyong Buk and Kyong Nam Provinces in the
southeast accounted for another 40 percent of manufacturing employment, 30 percent of urban population
and 30 percent of total population. During the 1980s, however, the rapid urban growth began to shift
from Seoul to the regional cities. During the last decade, the populations of Taegu, Inchon and Kwangju
grew up to 3.2 percent per annum, while the populations of Seoul and Pusan increased at 1.9 and 1.5
percent per annum, respectively, and the Korea's overall population growth rate declined to less than 1
percent per annum.
2. Korea's rapid economic development and urbanization out-paced the construction of capacity of
transport infrastructure in most major cities. With the continuing rise in income and living standards,
residential growth in suburbs, and the development of a local car manufacturing industry, vehicle
ownership in Korea increased from 0.38 million in 1983 to 3.5 million in 1993, a nine-fold increase
within a decade. The total number of passenger trips by all modes rose over seven times from 1971-92
and about five and one-half times for passenger kms. However, highways had increased passenger trips
by 40 times and freight-tons by 19 times in terms within the same period.
3. The Bank's involvement in urban transportation in the Republic of Korea began in 1980, in
response to a Government request for Bank assistance to review the urban transport situation in major
cities. The mission identified the need for improvement in traffic and transport management, urban
transport policy formulation, strengthening of key institutions and improvement of coordination among
various national and local governmental institutions. The Government subsequently undertook
Transportation Improvement Studies, financed by the Bank, in the major cities (Seoul, Pusan, Taegu,
Kwangju and Taejon), which formed the basis for subsequent urban transportation projects in Korea. The
first such project was implemented in Seoul (the Seoul Urban Transportation Project, Loan 2514-KO,
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approved in May, 1985, closed in June 1992). The Seoul Urban Transportation Project was designed
to finance the construction of urban transport infrastructure and introduce Transport System Management
(TSM) techniques. The concept of TSM was successfully introduced into Korea through the project,
although it remained only partially embraced due to its novelty, limited professional expertise in how to
manage the systems, and the tendency for public agencies to emphasize capital investment. The beneficial
impacts of TSM, which is dependent upon reasonable traffic volumes, were fewer than originally
expected due to constant increases in the traffic volume in the city, which out-paced the construction of
new capacity.
4. At the same time, Taegu continued to play an important regional role, with population growing
at 2.4 percent per annum, overall employment up 5.1 percent per annum, and employment in service
industries increasing by 5.9 percent per annum. At the project identification in 1986, the population of
the City was 2.1 million and was expected to increase by 3.04 percent per annum. Between 1980 and
1986 the number of vehicles in Taegu increased by 17 percent per annum and the number of cars more
than tripled, which resulted in an increase of over 50 percent in traffic volume in the City, especially in
the Central Business District (CBD), and decreasing operating speeds and severe congestion. Vehicle
ownership was very high in Taegu at almost 12 percent of the population, and was expected to increase
by 10.3 percent per annum. By way of comparison, vehicle ownership in Seoul and Pusan were 11.2
percent and 7.6 percent, respectively, and the national average was about 7.9 percent.
5. In light of these growing urban transport issues, and based on recommendations of the previous
Bank-financed study, Taegu City Government (TCG) created a Transportation Planning and Management
Division to consolidate traffic planning and develop a four-year program of traffic management and public
transport improvement measures. TCG decided upon a two-phased approach. In the short term,
efficiency and safety improvements of the existing road network would be sought through the introduction
of TSM techniques, and, in the medium term, the road capacity would be increased through the
construction of an urban expressway, the Shinchon Expressway. The Shinchon Expressway, which would
run along Shinchon River from north to south of the city, was expected to provide the most effective
bypass to the CBD and relieve traffic congestion in the vicinity of the industrial area situated in the
northern part of the city. While the Sinchon Expressway would provide a much needed north-south road
link within the city, it was also expected that the construction of two additional east-west bridges over
the Sinchon River would alleviate city-wide traffic problems caused by traffic stuck trying to cross the
Sinchon River's over burdened bridge network.
Proiect Objectives and Description
6. Objectives. The project was designed to assist TCG to manage future traffic problems by
supporting two of TCG's principal transport-related objectives:
(a) to increase the efficiency, capacity and safety of the existing transportation system in
Taegu through the introduction and applications of TSM techniques and the construction
of a major urban expressway with associated links; and
(b) to build the institutional capacity to plan, design and implement traffic and safety
improvement, and deal with future transportation problems.
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7. Proiect Description. The major components of the project were:
(a) Major Road Investments
Land acquisition and construction of around 9.5 km of the Shinchon Expressway and
connecting roads and bridges, and consultant services for construction supervision;
(b) TSM and Safety Improvements
Construction of intersection improvements, channelization, markings, and pedestrian
facilities, and the installation of traffic signals; and
(c) Institutional Development
Advisory services, training and equipment.
Project Design and Organization
8. The project was a continuation of the Bank's efforts in the urban transport subsector to assist the
Government to maintain the efficiency of Korea's major cities not only through the construction of new
roads but also through better utilization of the existing road network by encouraging use of TSM
techniques, and establishing and strengthening transportation planning capabilities in the cities.
9. Taegu City Government, the Borrower, is an independent legal entity with the status of a Direct
Jurisdictional City, and it's agencies prepared and implemented the project. Construction of the city
infrastructure was carried out by the Road Division of the Construction and Housing Bureau-,while the
TSM component was implemented by the Traffic Police Section and the Transportation Planning
Management Division. Overall coordination of the project and liaison with the Bank was provided by
the Director of the Planning and Management Bureau, who reported directly to the Mayor. The design
proved efficient in terms of supervision costs, averaging 5.6 staff weeks per year for the project.
10. Based, in part, on the experience gained in the Seoul Urban Transport Project, the project relied
on the complimentary strategy of increased capacity and transport efficiency management. While TSM
was necessary to get the most out of the existing network, it was not sufficient since, as in the Seoul case,
over saturated roads would not yield the full benefits. Similarly, simply expanding road capacity by
constructing the Shinchon Expressway would not solve the congestion problems of the CBD. Together,
however, it was anticipated that the diversion traffic away from the CBD would both ease inner-city
traffic congestion and to allow TSM measures to take full effect.
Project Implementation
11. Implementation of the project was satisfactory. The Construction and Housing Bureau carried
out the civil works and land acquisition components of the project. The TSM component was
implemented by the Traffic Police Section and the Transportation Planning and Management Division.
The project was implemented over a five year period, with the loan becoming effective on November 15,
1988, and closed on December 31, 1993. The implementation schedule slipped due to delays in land
acquisition, which also caused a large increase in the overall cost of the project (para. 13).
Disbursements were somewhat off the estimated disbursement schedule due to these delays. However,
the project loan was fully disbursed as of October 1, 1993, and was closed on December 31, 1993, as
scheduled at appraisal.
- 4 -
12. The implementation of the civil works component of the project was satisfactory. The
construction work itself proceeded without major incident, with those problems that arose being solved
without undue delay or excessive cost. Civil works for Shinchon Expressway was the largest component,
involving over 70% of the civil works costs, and was divided into five contract packages. They were
procured through international competitive bidding (ICB), but due to the very competitive and efficient
local construction industry, all were let with local contractors. Civil works for two bridges were
procured through local competitive bidding (LCB). The implementation of three access roads was
postponed and, thus, civil works for these roads were not implemented (para. 15). Construction of
Chungdong Bridge started as early as March, 1988, which was only one month after the project was
approved by the Board. All civil works were finished by June 13, 1993, except for the three postponed
crossroads.
13. The right-of-way required for the project involved the acquisition of 179,965 square meters of
land and the relocation of 1,990 families (7,090 people). Land acquisition for Shinchon started in 1984,
with the proceedings governed by the "Special Law on Acquisition and Compensation of Lands for Public
Use", established in 1975. The Bank accepted the procedures in its appraisal of the project. Under this
law, TCG's Construction and Housing Bureau made initial surveys and investigations, and prepared initial
valuations of compensation payable for property, loss of livelihood, and relocation expenses. These were
forwarded to TCG's Gu Offices for verification and discussion with the affected persons. These
procedures progressed, in general, without major difficulty. There were few disputes; those that did arise
were eventually settled and there are no outstanding claims.
14. The estimated total land acquisition cost for the project at appraisal was Won 37.7 billion
(US$47.1 million) including the relocation of 2,300 families. However, land prices throughout Korea
increased dramatically more than expected. In 1990, TCG re-estimated the land acquisition costs for
Shinchoii Expressway at W 91 billion (USS114.0 million -- or about half of the increased total project
cost.) To defer expenditures to meet the city's available funding, TCG decided to extend the project
implementation schedule by one year to the end of 1993, which coincided with the loan closing date.
During implementation of the land acquisition component, TCG was successful in paying a fair and timely
compeinsation for both property and loss of livelihood, and even provided alternative housing. TCG paid
US$170 million (or 60% of the actual total project cost) for the land acquisition and compensation, which
was ahlmost quadruple the estimated costs at appraisal (US$45.5 million). Further, TCG issued 437
tickets for families to obtain new apartment houses.
15. In February, 1993, TCG proposed to postpone the construction of the three cross roads of
Shinclhon Expressway: Second Taebong Bridge - Namguchong; Chilson PB - Shinchon Road; and
Chungdonig Bridge-Bondok School. This postponement was due to financial constraints in meeting the
high costs of land acquisition and displacement of an additional 1 ,500 people. The Bank concurred with
the postponement. The works will likely be completed using TCG's own resources at a future date.
Since displacement and relocation of families affected by the project is a matter of deep concern, the Bank
should assure itself that future activities will continue to be carried out in accordance with procedures
agreed between the Bank and TCG.
16. TCG, with a flexible implementation schedule, successfully carried out the TSM and Safety
Improvement component of the project. This component included civil works for intersection
improvement and channelization, goods for traffic signals and related equipment, and technical assistance
and training. All items in this component were procured using TCG's own resources. Since traffic
conditions had been changing with the growth in vehicles and completion of Shinchon Expressway, TCG
reviewed and modified the designs for the improvements in 1991 and beyond. This extended the
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implementation of this component to 1993, while it was expected to be completed by 1991 at appraisal.
TSM components were successfully completed and considered a pioneering initiative in Korea with the
large-scale introduction of TSM strategies to improve the safety and capacity of the urban street system.
17. Consulting services and technical assistance for this project were obtained by TCG, using its own
resources. These included consulting services for supervision of construction and TSM design. Training
on TSM was carried out at the early stages of the project to apply obtained expertise and experience into
designing the TSM.
Results
18. Overall, the project has been a success. While some of the cross roads of Shinchon Expressway
were postponed, the project made a substantial contribution toward achieving TCG's goals for an increase
in traffic efficiency, capacity and safety in Taegu through the introduction and application of TSM
techniques and the construction of Shinchon Expressway with its associated links. Qualitative and
quantitative indicators show that the TSM and safety investments, together with Shinchon Expressway,
had a city-wide impact, resulting in significantly reduced delays and accident rates. This project also
created a significant institutional benefit by strengthening TCG's transportation planning and traffic
management capability.
19. The economic rates of return (ERRs) for the project were estimated at appraisal to be 25 % with
a benefit in vehicle operations costs (VOC) only, and 37% with both benefits in VOC and the value of
time saved. Traffic volumes increased slightly more than those predicted at appraisal, with estimated
annual average rate increases of 8.11 percent between 1988-1996, and 6.82 percent from 1996 on, which
pushed up the benefits. Bid prices were also lower than expected. However, benefits from lower bid
prices and increased traffic were more than offset by the increased land acquisition and compensation
costs, which quadrupled from US$45.5 million to US$170 million doubling the project's total cost from
US$145.7 million to US$269.3 millon. This resulted in lower ERRs than expected at appraisal -- 12.3%
for the case with VOC only and 20.8% for the case with VOC and time savings.
Project Sustainability
20. The Bank-financed sub-projects are likely to maintain acceptable levels of net benefit throughout
their economic life. TCG has been providing a proper budget for maintenance of the Sinchon
Expressway. The expressway and bridges financed by the Bank provide access to the expressway, which
created an essential capacity for diverting the north-south traffic from trunk city streets and significantly
eased traffic congestion in the city. The 6-lane Shinchon Expressway currently provides sufficient
capacity to accommodate the 110-120 thousand vehicles per day expected by the year 2008, and has
diverted enough traffic from the CBD to have allowed the TSM measures to be fully effective. On the
institutional side the main risk is that the TSM measures would not be adjusted to new traffic conditions.
However, there is every indication that TSM has been adopted and will continue to gain force in Taegu.
Even during implementation, the TSM were adapted to changing circumstances, providing useful
experience for future changes expected to arise from the construction of a subway system.
21. One threat to sustainability is that traffic volumes continue to increase faster than forecasts, and
have potential to outstrip capacity, leading to a degradation of any TSM strategy as inner-city roads
become over saturated. However, subway construction works are underway, which, upon completion,
should absorb some traffic and will contribute to securing the lasting efficiency of the TSM efforts in the
city, even for future traffic. This is especially true since, once public transportation is in place, demand-
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side measures to control traffic volumes become more feasible. The benefits from safety improvements
would also increase after the completion of the subway system as intersection improvements including
channelization, markings and pedestrian facilities, were designed to reduce accidents for efficient and non-
saturated traffic flows.
Bank Performance
22. Bank performance was satisfactory. At the operational level, Bank staff contributed to the
success of the Project by recognizing TCG, especially the Construction and Housing Bureau, as mature
and capable institutions and enabling them to play a new role. Bank staff kept this focus throughout the
project, even when confronted with the sudden increase of the land acquisition and compensation costs.
Borrower Performance
23. The Borrower performed well during the challenging period of unanticipated rapid economic
growth and sudden increase in land prices, anticipating each phase ahead of project implementation,
preparing for it, and making necessary changes when the situation demanded.
24. The Borrower also complied with agreements reached at negotiations and performed well in
achieving project objectives. TCG showed no significant variation in civil works between the expenditure
program and the actual appropriation. Disbursement was 100% of the planned expenditure. However,
the requirement to supply the Bank with annual audit reports was not complied with in a timely manner.
Proiect Relationships
25. The Bank and the Borrower maintained a good relationship throughout the project's life cycle,
where the changing conditions (between anticipated and actual economic performance) required their joint
effort, mutual respect and flexibility. The introduction of comprehensive TSM was a new challenge to
the Bank and TCG staff and turned out to be a success. The Bank's recognition of TCG's institutional
capabilities might have created a favorable framework and contributed to the quality of the communication
between the parties.
Consulting Services
26. All the consultants engaged under the project appear to have performed well. In general,
supervision was considered efficient and the quality of work was also good.
Proiect Documentation and Data
27. All the basic documents needed to prepare the PCR were available within the Division and
feasibility study reports were available for the performance evaluation of the Project. In general, they
were clear and adequate.
Lessons Learned
28. The major risk identified at appraisal was that of potential delays related to the relocation of an
estimated 2,000 families. The risk was not considered great because, "experience indicates that
assessment and payment of compensation to affected persons is done in a fair and timely manner in
Korea." What was not predicted was that the dramatic increase in the cost of land could lead to delays
in coming up with the funds to finance fair compensation. The appraisal was correct in its assessment
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that TCG had proper resources to recover the hike in the project cost because the main sources of revenue
for TCG were the acquisition tax (based on land purchases), registration tax (based on land purchases)
and property tax (based on assessed value of fixed assets). However, as it turned out, the land acquisition
and compensation costs were nearly quadrupled, resulting in a significant underestimation of the required
cost and time, and TCG had to postpone the construction of the three cross roads of Shinchon
Expressway. The Bank needs to ensure that the cost and scheduling of land acquisition are carefully
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REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TAEGU URB3AN TRANSPORT PROJEECT (LOAN 2908-KO)
PROJECT COMIPLETION REPORT
Table 1: Related Bank Loans
Loan Purpose Year of Status Comments
Approval
Highway To construct 372 km of national highways between Chonju and Pusan; 1971 Closed PCR issued:
Project feasibility studies and detailed engineering of 1,400 km and 1,100 PPAR No.
(Ln. 769-KO) km, respectively: a highway maintenance study and establishment of a 3045 of June
pilot maintenance organization and purchase of highway maintenance 1980
equipment.
Second To assist the Government's 1972-76 road construction and paving 1974 Closed PCR issued:
Highway program and ro expand road mainienance organization. To construct PPAR No.
Project national highways from Saemal to Gangreung (97 km) and Gangreung 3045 of June
(Ln. 956-KO) to Mukho (33 km); pave and improve 634 km of national highways: 1980
procure maintenance equipment and carry out feasibility studies and
detailed engineering of 1,000 km of national and provincial roads.
Third Highway To cater for growing traffic on the highway system by extending the 1976 Closed PCR issued:
Project nerwork of all-weather paved highways (800 km) berween the main PPAR No.
(Ln. 1203-KO) centers of population and carry out feasibility studies and detailed 5024 of April
engineering (1,200 km) to prepare future projects. 1984
Fourth To assist in improving the highway system by extending the network 1979 Closed PCR issued:
Highway of paved highways by some 1,230 km and by preparing a program for PPAR'No.
Project improving the maintenance and development of the provincial and 5450 of
(Ln. 1640-KO) county (gun) road system. February
1985
Provincial and To assist the Borrower to improve some 1,000 km of county (gun) or 1982 Closed PCR issued:
County Roads tertiary network roads tlhroughout the country and to establish and PPAR No.
Project equip appropriate maintenance organizations for the provincial and 8372 of
(Ln. 2228-KO) country road networks. February
______________ 1990
Highway To assist the government in increasing efficiency in its highway sector 1984 Closed PCR issued:
Sector Project through improvement in investment planning, transport regulation and PPAR No.
(Ln. 2392-KO) pricing, and energy conservation. 9243 of
December
1990
Seoul Urban To construct urban transport infrastructure and introduce Transport 1985 Closed PCR submitted
Transporation System Management (TSM) techniques along selected transport io OED on
Project corridors and in the Central Business District of Seoul Special Ciry, March 31,
(Ln. 2514-KO) as well as to preserve and strengthen public transport and promote 1993.
instirutional development of the Seoul Metropolitan Government and
the Traffic Police Department.
Kyonggi To help increase the efficiency of transport in the Kyonggi Region by: 1988 Closed PCR No.
Regional (a) physically improving the transport infrastructure in two corridors; 12230 of
Transpon (b) supporting the ongoing process of coordination of transport August 5,
Project investment planning in the region; (c) supporting the governments' 1993.
(Ln. 2905-KO) commitment to conduct a Traffic Management Study in the secondary
cities served by Bank investment: and (d) supporting the preparation
of a comprehensive transport investment program.
Road The project was designed to support the Govemnment's Sixth Plan, to 1989 PCR PCR under
Improvement complete some initiatives begun under previous Bank-assisted projects under preparation
Project and to help to increase transport capaciry during the Sixth Plan period preparati
(Ln. 3061-KO) (1987-91) to suppon three principal road-related Govemment on
objectives: (a) enhancing transport effciency by upgrading the surface
aind alignment of existing roads and by improving road maintenance
and operations: (h) caoandinE traffic capacirt hy widening roads in
corridors with high transport demand: a.d (c) increasing traffiL :,alery
through a number of measures, including safery-conscious design of
project facilities, modification of design standards and practices,
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Table 2: Project Timetable
Item Date Planned I Actual Date
Identification | NA 1 986
IEPS NA Oct. 7, 1986
Preappraisal NA Nov. 23, 1986
Appraisal Mission Aug. 1, 1987 Jul. 21, 1987
Yellow Cover Oct. 1, 1987 Aug. 31, 1987
President's Report NA NA
Loan Negotiation Nov. 15, 1987 Nov. 13, 1987
Boad Approval Dec. 15, 1987 Feb. 9, 1988
Loan Signature NA Sep. 13, 1988
Loan Effectiveness Jan. 1 5, 1988 Nov. 1 5, 1988
Loan Closing | Dec. 31, 1993 Dec. 31, 1993
Loan Completion | Jun. 30, 1993 Oct. 1, 1993
First Supervision NA Nov. 18,1988
Last Supervision NA Sep. 2, 1993
- 12 -
REPUBLIC OF KOREA
TAEGU URBAN TRANSPORT PROJECT (LOAN 2908-KO)
PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT
Table 3A: Curnulative Disbursements (Plannsed v. Actual)
(US$ Million Equivalent)
Fiscal Year/Semester Planned Disbursements Actual Disbursements
1988
June, 1988 2.00 0.00
1989
December, 1988 3.80 2.00
June, 1989 6.00 2.00
1990
December, 1989 7.90 2.00
June, 1990 10.80 5.42
1991
December, 1990 13.50 8.90
June, 1991 17.30 12.51
1992
December, 1991 20.50 13.52
June, 1992 24.00 21.08
1993
December, 1992 27.10 27.71
June, 1993 30.00 28.87
1994
December, 1993 30.00
Disbursements (Planned v. Actual)







Jun-88 Jun'89 Jun 90 Jun 91 Jun-92 Jun-93
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Table 3B: FIinal Disbursemcnit Allocation By Category
(US$ Million Equivalent)
Est Cost (SAR) Foreign as Actual Cost Foreign as
Project Expenditure
! 7ItJ I ( 7121 ) of total % -4L - l - of total X
Local '4AA Foreign 214 Total A -q 214xl d X Local '-114 Foreign 214 Total t| 214ul* X
1. Shinchon Express isy -iLIit lI 45.1 24.3 69.4 35 51 23.8 74.8 32
2. Other Roads and br!dges 71E-.Z t ; ; L 4.7 2.8 7.5 38 10.0 6.2 16.2 38
3. Transportation Systems Management 29- ; 7ll-qJ 4.1 5.6 9.7 57 18.1 0 18.1 0
4. Land *E ;X 45.6 0 45.6 0 170.0 0 170.0 0
5. Engineering 71 j31 2.2 0.6 2.8 20 2.2 0 2.2 0
6. Tech. Assistance 71 ;1I t . 0.4 0.4 0.8 50 0.7 0 0.9 0
Contingencies W4 HI kl 6.9 3.0 9.9 30
- Physical o.l ? III 2.8 1.7 4.5 37 _
- Price J Aii 4.1 i.3 5.4 25
Total Project CosE J 'i1 109 36.7 145.7 25 252 30.0 282 1I
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Table 4: Implemenitation Schedule (Actual)
1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1. SHIN CJION EIPRESS WAt -AL 1 7 '
a. Chimsan 3r - Kyongdae Br tJ t 12 D D D F C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
b. Kvongdae Br - 2nd Shincbon Br M-l 2fj 2 L D D D F C C C C C C C C C C C
c. 2nd Shirnhon Br - Susong Br 21 1 , -_T- 9 7 D D B A C C C C C C C C C C c
d. Taebong 3r - Chungdong Br 051 - __6 U D D DF F D B A C C C C CC C C C
e. Associated Extensions 1 2l ! jQ D D D F B A C C C C C C C C
2. OTIIER ROADS AND BRIDGES 7IE1 2- c 2l 
a. 2nd Taebong Br - Samguchong 1i D d D
b. Cbilsong PB - Shinchon Rd IL Z4 L -- Q 1E3 D D D
c. Chungdang Br - Bongduk Sch z5 Q5 D - 5 2 _R D D D
n. 2nd Taebwng Br A1j2 4 "D D D D BA C C C C C C
e. Cbung daug Br 2s ii2 D B A C C C C
3. TRAFFIC STSTEX NiANAGEYEST 7 I 'Z > 7| -Li
a. CED Ioprovemcnt :!i .J1 Li D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC
b. Express lav 4- Other lprovement J E + 21 EJ A[l . 7H fA
c. Safety I3provement 9 j AI g_j 7H 2i D BA CC CC 0 BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC
d. Public Transport lmprovement C si1 A A Li?ffAJ D BA CC CC 1 BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC D BA CC CC
4. ENGRI.G A TECH. ASSIST 72i XFQ9 7kaxftj j _
a. Construction Supervison =A. .7pj B C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C C
b. T.S.M Technical Assistance T.S. M 21jE Xl
c. T.S.X Training T.S.M ss E D BA C C C C
d. T.S24 Design Superv:son T.S.M A)II al gl D1 BA C C C C
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Table SA: Cost By Component
(Unit: US$ Million)
Est Cost (SAR) Actual Cost
Project Component
1s .7t" Ul- (;II11 ) a] uI+
At °lit -: 
Local 141 Foreign -4 7- Total 711 Local 14| Foreign 2-171- Total 711
1. Shinchon Express way -*-It 1.-. 45.1 24.3 69.4 205.07 23.84 228.91
Civil Works 1 A. 50.94 23.84 74.78
Lind .9 7) 152.37 152.37
!, Construction Supervision 74 El 1.76 1.76
2. Other Roads and bridges 7) p r- 5 4.7 2.8 7.5 15.43 6.16 25.59
Civil Works 1 Al. 10.02 6.16 16.18
Land g. 7) . 4.94 4.94
Construction Supervision 4 0 . 0.47 0.47
3. Transportation Systems Management .2, -* J 7l l . 4.1 5.6 9.7 18.77 18.77
Civil Works 5 Al 18.1 18.1
T.S-M Technical Assistance T.S.M 71 *. 71 _ 0.27 0.27
T.S.H Design Supervi3on T.S.M 4i?711 7I ?I 0.40 0.40
T.S.H Training T.S.M it2- ?8
4. Contingencies al ' l .i 6.9 3.0 9.9 - -
Physical A I til
Price ' 4J "I
Total Project Cost J 711 60.8 3S.7 96.5 | 239.27 30.0 269.27
I
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Table 5B: Project Financing
(Million Won)
Planned A|l m Actual -3 
Project Expenditur
Bank Taegu Total Bank Taegu Total
+*s [d il d 1 t Loan (X) City ( %) Loan ( %) City (X )
1. Shinchon Express vay jtLl S 18,420 33 37,045 67 55,465 17,993 32 37,976 68 55,969
2. Other Roads and bridges 71t-. £ 9- 2u 1,999 33 4,020 67 6,019 4,505 38 
7,335 62 11,840
. ~~~~~~~~~~~~I
3. Transportation Systems Management 2 1 73 1 1,501 19 6,267 81 7,768 _ 
- 12,669 100 12,669
4. Land . 1 0 0 36,450 100 36,450 - - 110,120 
100 110,120
S. Engineering and Tech, Asst 711iJ-*f 71l 0 0 2,904 100 2,904 - _ 
2.032 100 2.032
6. Contingencies t 8i 'l 2,080 26 5,877 74 7,957 _ - -
Total Project Cost l I11 24,000 21 92.563 79 116,563 22.498 12 170,132 88 192,630
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Table 5C: Detailed Project Cost (Actual) IUSS = 700Won
Million Won -l ?Ž1 million US S Foreign X X of Total Cost
Local A14 t oreign 29 A4 Total 711 Local -1 H Foreign 214 Total 71 214 8- }7I1°)91 uI*
l. SHIN CHO.N EXPRESS WAYi 4qER V 37,976 17,993 55,969 50.941 23.843 74.784 32.15 29.05
a. Chimsan Br - Xyongdae Br A- m - 74 Lo 1 . 10,489 5,421 15,910 13.852 7.159 21.011 34.07 8.26
b. Kyongdae Br - 2nd Shinchon Br 7.ii LR - Al 2 2 ;L 10,191 5,654 15,845 13.515 7.498 21.013 35.68 8.23
c. 2nd Shinchon Br - Susong Br 2412 2 Y w-- _ 4 -IJ 4,115 1,978 6,093 5.841 2.807 8.648 32.46 3.16
d. Taebong Br - Chungdong Br * * i - i-k 2 7,978 4,940 12.918 10.300 6.379 16.679 38.24 6.70
e. Associated Extensions ' 711 '-.s 5,203 _ 5,203 7.433 _ 7.433 _ 2.70
2. OTHER ROADS AND BRIDGES 71EF- . e a 7,335 4,505 11,840 10.015 6.157 16.172 38.05 6.15
a. 2nd Taebong Br - Naaguchong 7RI2 t1 -M -_ \' ;V _
b. Chilsong PB - Shinchon Rd V -1 - -_ -A- _ r _
c. Chungdong Br - Bongduk Sch iM Qi;R - * t i3 ___
d. 2nd Taebong Br 212tI2 - M 40 .* 4 *5'- 4 1 '-
e. Cbung dong Br 1- 7-1 932 621 1,553 1.366 0.910 2.276 39.99 0.81
f. Hyomok over Pass -t 4 7I m 6,403 3,884 10,287 8.649 5.247 13.896 37.76 5.34
3. TRAFFIC SYSTEM MANAGEMENT M -f _° 7R Aq 12,669 12,669 18.1 18.1 6.58
a. CED Improvement i221-g 5' * &7I 5,593 5.593 7.99 7.99 2.90
b. Express Way + Other lIprovement - - F 9 + 71 f4 Al 1 7R -.J
c. Safety lprovement 0 { I A 7R I 1,039 1,039 1.48 1.48 0.54
d. Public Transport Improvement t 'ij;Z M A1- 7 M- 4,129 4,129 5.90 5.90 2.14
e. Traffic Signals 2 - -j 71 1,278 1,278 1.83 1.83 0.67
f. Other Equipment 71E.1- 'a I (< -1? 630 630 0.90 0.90 0.33
4. LAND .f. tl 110,120 110.120 170.02 170.02 57.17
a. Shinchon Express way -<1* t:U CH 110,120 110,120 157.31 157.31 57.17
b. Other Roads 71Ek £ ;
C. Traffic System YanageDent ; a OJ17R d 
5. ENGRING k TECH, ASSIST 71 -I29 71 * 1I i| 2,032 2.032 2.90 | 2.90 1.05
a. Construct.on Supervison ?A I ;.- e 1,564 IA64 2.23 2.23
b. T.S.M Technical Assistance T.S.U 71I s1l 
c. T.S.M Tra:ning T.S.M 2-,- ?_A 277 277 0.40 0.40
d. T.S.M Des:gn Superv:ovn T.S.M Aj 711 V 7j?I 191 191 0.27 0.27
TOTUL PROJECT Ct,Sr l 711 170,132 22,198 192.630 251 .976 30.0 281.976 100 X 
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Table 5D: Detailed Land Acquisition and Compenisationi (Won Miliion 9T°F-)
Area °- 4 Owner W 4X Xt Compensation A. P. T P. R. A Renter AlI iXI Compensation A. P. T P. R. A
Ticket Ticket Ticket Ticket
(sq.m) Family 2Fj1 Persons CST ¢ tJ 8j 0fl,1 f N Family 7-il Personsej to Mc II OfjI e E 2I
=°a J14 AlOot t10
1. SHIN CHO.N EXPRESS WAY 150,237 1.016 3,473 3,285 426 890 3.286 1,635
a. Chimsan Br - Kyongdae Br 50,000 103 506 424 26 421 1,684 697
l2 7 T1 - 9 Ct -,-
b. Kvongdae Br - 2nd Sbinchon Br 16,000 34 131 132 7 114 406 193
9 Or -;Sf 2ti Lj .2
c. Taebong Br - Chungdong Br 37,500 473 1,429 1,564 332 99 297 234
d. 2nd Shinchon Br - Susong Br 20,000 244 859 185 23 57 235 45
Aj 2j iI -T ;J -2
e. Associated Extensions 26,737 162 548 980 38 199 664 466
2. OTHER ROADS AND BRIDGES 29,728 26 99 107 11 58 232 160
-71Q E el wWt .- - I 5
a. 2nd Tacbong Br - Saaguchong 9,700
-1 2 CA g.2 - *ff
b. Chilsong PB - Shinchon Rd 6,228 16 64 107 11 58 232 160
-2 j P} I -| tl i q 4 .
c. Chungdong Br - Bongduk Sch 13,800 10 35 .
w;F 9 N1 -sCR .1
d. 2nd Jaebong Br
;1 2Uf-.2
c. Chungdong Br
f. Heomok Over Pass
Sub Total 179,965 1,042 3,572 3,392 437 948 3,518 1,795
24 .
Shinchon Express way 150,237 1.016 3,473 3,285 426 890 3,286 1,635
Other Roads 29,728 26 99 107 II 58 232 160
j1 P I C .
T(,TAL PR(s3Ec7 CIiST 2. 24 179,965 1.042 3.572 3.392 4 37 948 3.518 1,795
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Table 6: Economic Rate of Returin
Economic Rate of Return Base Case Cost +25% Benefit -25%
w/o Time w Time w/o Time w Time w/o Time w Time
SAR (%) 24.7 37.2 21.5 32.5 20.6 31.3
Actual (%) 12.3 20.8 ----
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Table 7: Status of Loan Covenants
LOAN AGREEMENT
Agreement
Section No. Description of Covenant Status I Comments
3.03(b) Consultants for transportation Compliance Korea Transport Institute
planning, traffic engineering and selected/appointed
safety improvements shall be November, 1988
appointed by December 31, 1988
4.01 Borrower shall (a) maintain Compliance Annual Audit Reports
adequate records of accounts, (b) were submitted prior to
submit audits, and (c) obtain 1992. A combined Audit
separate opinion for disbursements Report for 1992 r1993
through SOE has been submitted
4.02 Feasibility study for proposed Compliance Feasibility study for
extension to Sinchon Expressway associate scheme of
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Table 8: Estimated Completion Costs
(Including All Sources of Funds)
Activity Staffweeks Dollars (thousand)
Preparation 15.3 40.8
Appraisal 8.2 21.7
Negotiations/Board 7.5 19.8
Supervision 28.2 75.8
PCR 5 9.2
Total 64.2 167.3


IMAGING
Report No: 14711
Type: PCR
